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ECO290 - Strategic Decision Making: An Introduction to Game Theory
Catalog Description: Introduces game theory and strategic thinking. Examines dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling and applies these concepts to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere. It is recommended that the college's reading and math requirements have been met.
Lecture: 3 hrs.
Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs):
Upon successful completion of this course as documented through writing, objective testing, case studies, laboratory practice, and/or classroom discussion, the student will be able to:
1.Explain the concept of strategic games.
2.Define dominant strategy and weakly dominant strategy.
3.Define Nash equilibrium.
4.Define Pareto Optimality.
5.Define backward induction.
6.Solve simultaneous games.*
7.Solve sequential games.*
8.Solve repeated games involving mixed strategies.
9.Define the moral hazard, incentives and signaling.
11.Explain the concepts of cooperative games and strategic alliances.*
12.Theorize possible and probable strategies where information is incomplete or asymmetric.
13.Solve games presented in prose in the context of business, politics and international relations.
14.Ability to apply methods learned in the course to new strategic decision problems and to be able to solve these problems.
* This course objective has been identified as a student learning outcome that must be formally assessed as part of the Comprehensive Assessment Plan of the college. All faculty teaching this course must collect the required data and submit the required analysis and documentation at the conclusion of the semester to the Office of Institutional Research and Assessment.
I. Introduction to Game Theory and its terminology
II. Simultaneous games, dominant and weakly dominant strategies
III. Sequential games and backward induction
IV. Mixed strategies in repeated games
V. Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling, Screening and telling Lies
VI. More games within business, politics and world affairs
Effective Term: Spring 2013